Not good enough, Punter!
07/01/10 11:28
In hindsight it might have been better if Australia had lost the Second Test against Pakistan.
That’s not taking anything away from a remarkable comeback from a seemingly impossible position, but I’d be happier if the comeback had been prompted by Australian tactical and strategic nous rather than an apparent Pakistani lack thereof.
Seriously, from a position where we were effectively eight for eighty it’s as much a case of Pakistan throwing away opportunities as Australia grabbing them.
Describing Pakistan’s tactics in the pre-lunch session as baffling is an understatement, though perhaps, given the number of dropped catches involved, it was a matter of waiting for Siddle and Hussey to make a mistake rather than being proactive in inducing one.
It’s fair to suggest that effective eight for eighty was the result of extreme good luck rather than good management.
While the win puts Australia on the way to a three-nil win in the three test series, which mightn’t suggest significant room for substantial improvement, the way we got there suggests that there are serious issues that need to be looked at.
The most obvious of those is the Australian game plan.
And the problem there is that it’s the Australian game plan. It seems that once the leadership group has made up its mind about the way we’re going to approach the game, that’s it.
In other words, the captain’s decision is final and no correspondence will be entered into.
That kind of mindset might have been OK back in the McGrath/ Warne/ Hayden/ Gilchrist era, but even then it wasn’t a hundred per cent foolproof.
I think it’s fair to argue that one of the reasons we lost The Ashes in 2005 because we stuck with a decision to insert the opposition if we won the toss despite the loss of one of the key components in the game plan.
Given McGrath’s last minute unavailability for the Second Test, surely it made more sense to choose to bat while we worked out an alternative bowling plan.
Given the fact that the wicket on offer in Sydney at the start of 2010 was hardly your typical SCG deck, and the fact that Ponting stated that batting was going to be difficult why did we decide to bat first?
Given that an inability to take twenty wickets and a failure to score enough runs batting first were significant factors in the 2009 Ashes disaster, conditions in Sydney should have produced game plans that took those issues into account, with the toss deciding which one was implemented.
In other words, on that wicket, winning the toss should have been an automatic decision to bowl. Losing the toss would have almost certainly have resulted in an invitation to bat, so under the circumstances either result would provide an opportunity to work on areas that could use a bit of attention.
More than that, it seems fairly obvious that batsmen from the subcontinent don’t like batting on decks that are doing a bit. There’s a fair case for arguing that no one does like batting on a greentop, but when it comes down to it Indians and Pakistanis are arguably more averse than most.
Add to that the fact that Watson’s run of form at the top of the order gives us the chance to go in with a four-man pace attack plus Hauritz and possibly North to bowl spin, it’s not going to be a case of overworking your bowlers.
With all that in mind, Ponting’s decision to bat first is baffling in the extreme. But if we were going to bat so that we could address that lack of runs in the first dig factor, then surely there needed to be an emphasis on getting your head down and occupying the crease for as long as possible.
Looking at those Day One dismissals, that was hardly the mindset on display.
From where I’m sitting it’s pretty obvious that we’re nowhere near as good as we think we are.
What worries me is what’s likely to happen when we run up against an opponent who’s inclined to twist the knife once it’s inserted rather than sitting back and waiting for the victim to bleed to death.
That’s not taking anything away from a remarkable comeback from a seemingly impossible position, but I’d be happier if the comeback had been prompted by Australian tactical and strategic nous rather than an apparent Pakistani lack thereof.
Seriously, from a position where we were effectively eight for eighty it’s as much a case of Pakistan throwing away opportunities as Australia grabbing them.
Describing Pakistan’s tactics in the pre-lunch session as baffling is an understatement, though perhaps, given the number of dropped catches involved, it was a matter of waiting for Siddle and Hussey to make a mistake rather than being proactive in inducing one.
It’s fair to suggest that effective eight for eighty was the result of extreme good luck rather than good management.
While the win puts Australia on the way to a three-nil win in the three test series, which mightn’t suggest significant room for substantial improvement, the way we got there suggests that there are serious issues that need to be looked at.
The most obvious of those is the Australian game plan.
And the problem there is that it’s the Australian game plan. It seems that once the leadership group has made up its mind about the way we’re going to approach the game, that’s it.
In other words, the captain’s decision is final and no correspondence will be entered into.
That kind of mindset might have been OK back in the McGrath/ Warne/ Hayden/ Gilchrist era, but even then it wasn’t a hundred per cent foolproof.
I think it’s fair to argue that one of the reasons we lost The Ashes in 2005 because we stuck with a decision to insert the opposition if we won the toss despite the loss of one of the key components in the game plan.
Given McGrath’s last minute unavailability for the Second Test, surely it made more sense to choose to bat while we worked out an alternative bowling plan.
Given the fact that the wicket on offer in Sydney at the start of 2010 was hardly your typical SCG deck, and the fact that Ponting stated that batting was going to be difficult why did we decide to bat first?
Given that an inability to take twenty wickets and a failure to score enough runs batting first were significant factors in the 2009 Ashes disaster, conditions in Sydney should have produced game plans that took those issues into account, with the toss deciding which one was implemented.
In other words, on that wicket, winning the toss should have been an automatic decision to bowl. Losing the toss would have almost certainly have resulted in an invitation to bat, so under the circumstances either result would provide an opportunity to work on areas that could use a bit of attention.
More than that, it seems fairly obvious that batsmen from the subcontinent don’t like batting on decks that are doing a bit. There’s a fair case for arguing that no one does like batting on a greentop, but when it comes down to it Indians and Pakistanis are arguably more averse than most.
Add to that the fact that Watson’s run of form at the top of the order gives us the chance to go in with a four-man pace attack plus Hauritz and possibly North to bowl spin, it’s not going to be a case of overworking your bowlers.
With all that in mind, Ponting’s decision to bat first is baffling in the extreme. But if we were going to bat so that we could address that lack of runs in the first dig factor, then surely there needed to be an emphasis on getting your head down and occupying the crease for as long as possible.
Looking at those Day One dismissals, that was hardly the mindset on display.
From where I’m sitting it’s pretty obvious that we’re nowhere near as good as we think we are.
What worries me is what’s likely to happen when we run up against an opponent who’s inclined to twist the knife once it’s inserted rather than sitting back and waiting for the victim to bleed to death.